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Abstract/executive summary (ca. 200 words): 
Preserving the native fauna and flora of Antarctica is a legal obligation on Antarctic Treaty signatory 
countries by the Madrid Protocol. This report addresses threats to the native biota that alien species 
present, particularly those with invasive characteristics. Historically, protection against alien species’ 
invasion has been achieved through increasingly rigorous and effective quarantine inspection 
procedures of people and cargo leaving for the territory. In recent years, monitoring has been 
recognised as important for identifying those species which slip through inspections, and there is 
increasing recognition of the need to formulate effective and unified response plans. 
This essay discusses these issues generally in the context of continental Antarctica, and goes on to 
relate them to specific needs identified as relating to New Zealand’s Scott Base. Invasive species 
from viruses, bacteria and algae to plants and small animals are considered. Recommendations are 
made for improvements in prevention, monitoring and response to preserve the Ross Island region 
in particular. These include suggestions for improving the Base’s reporting system for insect 
incursions, for effective monitoring of plants in the base vicinity and beyond, and the need for a full-
time biosecurity post. Key issues are identified that may form the basis of a comprehensive response 
plan, including the methods by which alien species can be reliably identified, how they should be 
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dealt with, and whether herbicides and pesticides might be acceptable solutions to curb their 
spread. 
Finally, the report considers areas in which more research is required before recommendations can 






This report discusses the three components of biosecurity - prevention, monitoring and response, 
and makes recommendations for improvement in these areas with particular relevance to the New 
Zealand Antarctic programme in the Ross Sea region. However, the discussion of alien introductions 
into the Antarctic region is a huge topic, covering a vast geographical area and all human activity in 
the region. Therefore this report considers only the Antarctic continent and Ross Island, using 
examples from the maritime Antarctic and sub-Antarctic islands only where these are directly 
relevant to the species under discussion. Furthermore, this report will consider only those activities 
relevant to national scientific programmes, and to the New Zealand operation in particular, and thus 
excludes tourism and fishing. Many recommendations in this report are directly relevant to matters 
and procedures related to Scott Base and issues which were observed while the author visited the 
station. 
The recommendations made in this report are summarised in the Appendix. 
 
1.2 The Antarctic Ecosystem 
Continental Antarctica is a predominantly ice-covered land, with only an estimated 0.34% of area 
being free from ice and snow (Convey, 2011). These few ice-free areas are generally to be found 
along the coasts, in the Dry Valleys, and as nunataks – mountains, either individual or as part of a 
range – protruding from the ice. A very small number of these, such as Mt Melbourne (Herbold, 
McDonald & Cary, 2014), Mt Rittmann (Bargagli, Broady & Walton, 1996), and Mount Erebus on Ross 
Island, are known to be geothermal. Human use of Antarctica tends to concentrate on these ice-free 
areas, for siting research bases, for scientific research and for tourist visits. The predominant reasons 
for this are the logistical ease of access and biological interest (Potter, 2006). As a result, some of 
these ice-free areas are extensively used, by national programmes, by tourists, or both, as well as by 
the birds who nest along the coastline, often in large colonies. Fur seals can also be found along the 
Antarctic Peninsula (TerraQuest, n.d., para. 9), while Southern Elephant seals come ashore to moult 
in the summer months (TerraQuest, n.d., para. 7), and occasional young Crab-eater seals are 
famously known to also come onto land to their deaths in the Dry Valleys, an unexplained 
phenomenon summarised by Baltham (2007).  
These ice-free areas have been identified as likely candidates for alien invasion. This is not only 
because of their natural ice-free condition, but also as a direct result of this human activity altering 
drainage patterns and causing soil disturbance (Potter, 2006), and by the obviously increased 
opportunity for human-mediated species introduction that accompanies the presence of more 
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humans. However, such low-altitude coastal areas, with less extreme temperatures than are found 
inland, are also home to the most diverse range of Antarctic species (Convey, 2015), making 
invasions particularly harmful to the continent’s ecosystem.  
The Antarctic biota is generally regarded as being species-poor relative to other ecosystems (Convey, 
2015) due to its isolation, its extreme climate and the lack of suitable habitats (Hughes& Convey, 
2010). Microorganisms form the largest group in terms of both species and number of organisms 
(Convey, 2015). Soil invertebrates such as Diptera, Acari, Collembola, Nematoda, Rotifera, 
Tardigrada and Protista form the second largest group, followed by basic plants such as liverworts 
and mosses, and by lichens (Hughes & Convey, 2010). The distribution of populations and species is 
strongly affected by local features such as height above sea level, wind patterns and precipitation, 
but generally decreases with distance inland (Hughes & Convey, 2010). Lichens and microbes are the 
two species found in the most extreme habitats (Hughes, Convey, Maslen & Smith, 2010). 
There are large gaps in knowledge about both Antarctic species distribution (Hughes & Convey, 
2010) and its trophic complexity (Convey, 2011). However, because the Antarctic ecosystem has 
many taxonomic gaps (Convey, 2015) it is generally assumed that it also has other qualities - little 
functional redundancy (Convey, 2015), simple community structures (Hughes et al, 2010a), and 
numerous ecological niches - which could be exploited by alien species (Convey, 2015). Native 
species are also believed to have limited ability to compete with invaders (Convey, 2015), and also to 
recover from disturbances very slowly, an assumption supported by observations in the Arctic, 
where such recovery can take over a century (Rudolph, 1970). 
Species on the continent can be divided into three general categories (Hughes et al, 2010a). The 
group of species which were present before the last Antarctic glacial maximum even includes a few 
surviving original Gondwanan species (Hughes & Worland, 2010). The second group is comprised of 
more recent colonisers which arrived through natural transport throughout the present interglacial 
period. The third group is made up of colonisers very recently introduced by humans. These recent 
introductions have the potential to cause significant changes to the Antarctic ecosystem by replacing 
many of the endemic species (Frenot et al, 2005). While this influx can be said to have the effects of 
filling unoccupied biological niches locally increasing biodiversity, and increasing the use of available 
resources (Brown & Sax, 2004), such invasions typically do so by replacing rare endemic species with 
species common elsewhere and generally regarded as invasive and damaging, such as rats and mice 
(Cassey, Blackburn, Duncan & Chown, 2005).  
Colonisation by natural means involves the transport of propagules (eggs, seeds and plant 
fragments) or live species on air or ocean currents, often carried along by other animals, or with 
debris (Hughes et al, 2010a). However Antarctica is kept isolated by ocean and air currents which 
circle the continent, which must first be crossed. These barriers have been effective in preserving 
the isolation of the continent from natural introductions (Hughes & Worland, 2010). However, since 
the advent of humans in Antarctica, this barrier is no longer effective. Substantial invasions have 
already occurred in the maritime Antarctic and Sub Antarctic islands. 
 
1.3 Invasive Species  
An alien species is, simply, one that is not native to an ecosystem and can be introduced by both 
natural and human routes (Frenot et al, 2005). Three types of aliens have been identified by Frenot 
et al, according to their behaviour. These categories are transient, persistent and invasive. Transient 
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aliens typically establish small populations which die out naturally within a short time frame. 
Persistent aliens establish populations and are capable of reproduction but insufficiently to spread 
from their initial location. Invasive species do spread, often prolifically, and displace other native 
species in the process. The terms “alien”, “transient”, “persistent” and “invasive” are used in this 
report as described by Frenot et al, (2005).  
Invasive species are generally abundant, can tolerate a wide range of environmental conditions and 
are often widespread across significant parts of the world (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen & Dukes, 
2008). They often have a short time to maturity, and invasive plants often have low seed mass which 
enhances their spread (Hellmann et al, 2008). Invasive plants are often long-lived, with about three 
quarters being perennial; by contrast the majority (65%) of transient plant species, from examples in 
the Kerguelen and Possession Islands, are annuals or biennials (Frenot et al, 2005). In this, invasive 
species are similar to native Antarctic species, which also tend towards life cycles longer than 1-2 
years (Frenot et al, 2005). It is also known, however, that it is very difficult to predict which species 
may become invasive in a given environment (Clout & De Poorter, 2008) although species are more 
likely to become invasive the longer they persist (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). Species which have 
shown themselves to be invasive elsewhere should also be regarded with particular suspicion 
(Houghton et al, 2016). 
Pysek and Richardson (2010) stress that whether a species becomes invasive within a given 
environment depends less upon the absolute characteristics of the alien than upon the match 
between the alien and the new environment. Some aliens are well matched upon introduction, but 
others adapt to fit their new home by evolution and hybridisation. Interactions with pre-existing 
species also play a key role, as a species is more likely to thrive if it has no natural predators or local 
pathogens. It appears that species that fill, or can adapt to fill, unfilled evolutionary niches in their 
new environment, have an advantage (Bergstrom & Chown, 1998; Convey, 2015), as will those that 
can more fully utilise local resources that are not efficiently being used by native species (Brown & 
Sax, 2004). Both of these make Antarctica particularly vulnerable, as does the established link 
between some alien invaders and human activities (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). As Antarctica 
experiences increasing levels of human activity, corresponding shifts in the balance between native 
and alien species can also be expected. At the same time, climate change may cause Antarctic 
conditions to be more hospitable to these arrivals. 
The impact of an introduced species can have a number of effects on the functioning of the local 
ecosystem. These range from small effects over long time periods to very significant effects over 
very short timescales (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). This has already been seen in the wider Antarctica 
region, with the introduction of an alien blowfly causing a decline in a native fly on the Kerguelen 
Islands (Gousemett, Hood, Lamers & O’Reilly, 2006), and by the presence of the introduced 
bluegrass causing reduced photosynthesis by nearby pearlwort and hairgrass on the South Shetland 
Islands (Molina-Montenegro et al, 2012). In addition, the same species of alien blowfly is suspected 
of changing the shoreline decomposition dynamics on South Georgia (Gousmett et al, 2006), and an 
alien midge is thought to have effected similar changes in nutrient turnover on Marion Island 
(Convey, Key & Key, 2010). Alien species can also themselves be vectors for the transmission of alien 
viruses, bacteria and fungal plant and animal pathogens (Hughes, Walsh, Convey, Richards & 
Bergstrom, 2005), instances of which have already been noted on several sub-Antarctic islands 
(Lebouvier et al, 2011). 
Alien species must overcome four hurdles to become invasive within a new environment (Hughes & 
Convey, 2010). They must be transported to the new location, and must survive the process. They 
must then survive upon arrival, and go on to establish a viable population with reproductive and 
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long term survival capabilities. Prior to the arrival of humans, the transportation barrier proved very 
effective at isolating Antarctica (Hughes et al, 2010a), with the result that it is not known what 
proportion of species would be viable if they were able to reach the continent in a viable condition 
(Hughes, Lee, Ware, Kiefer & Bergstrom, 2010). It has been theorised that the transportation and 
climate barriers were particularly significant for keeping out animal species, and that therefore 
human-mediated transport of new species will be most significant for the introduction of new alien 
animal, rather than plant, species (Hughes, et al, 2010b).  
Climate change is expected to be a significant factor in enhancing the ability of species to survive on 
the continent. Warming has already been recorded on the Peninsula, and is expected to cause 
similar changes along the coastline of the continent (Convey, 2011). As warming continues on the 
Antarctic Peninsula it will change the availability and distribution of freshwater, improving the 
establishment, flowering and germination of plants (Convey, 2011) in areas where freshwater 
availability increases. This is supported by evidence from the Antarctic Islands, where increases in 
alien plants have been seen in the South Shetland Islands (Olech & Chwedorzewska, 2011) and on 
Marion Island (Ranjith, Shukla, Vennila & Gashaw, 2012). More land may become suitable for 
colonisation in a similar way to that made available on Kerguelen by the retreat of the Ampere 
Glacier on Kerguelen, on which land five new alien species have become established (Frenot & 
Gloaguen, 1994). Climate changes may also have negative consequences for some native soil 
invertebrates (Frenot et al, 2005). Hellmann et al (2008) have identified five ways in which climate 
change will have implications for alien species as follows: 
• by altering introduction mechanisms,  
• by changing environmental constraints on invaders,  
• by altering the distribution of existing aliens,  
• by changing the impact of invaders and 
• by changing the effectiveness of strategies for managing, controlling and eradicating alien 
species. 
 
1.4 Antarctic Wilderness and Values 
It has been argued that the invasion of Antarctica by alien species constitutes a valuable opportunity 
to research the process of colonisation, and that therefore these invaders should be permitted to 
remain and spread (Brown & Sax, 2004). However, it should be pointed out that under the Antarctic 
Treaty, and specifically, under Annex II of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty (1991), the obligation to preserve the integrity of the Antarctic ecosystems has already been 
accepted by the Treaty Signatories (Australian Government: Department of the Environment, n.d.). 
This requires the parties to take measures to prevent the introductions of alien species (except 
where planned and permitted), with the explicit aim of protecting native flora and fauna (Antarctic 
Treaty System, n.d.).  
These obligations have been actioned in domestic laws in many of the signatory countries. In New 
Zealand, this became the Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994, which therefore binds all 
New Zealand citizens to this obligation (Antarctica New Zealand n.d. f, para. 3). 
Furthermore, the recognition of the Antarctic wilderness and aesthetic as protected also requires 
that the Antarctic environment be protected even from alien species that would not be harmful to 
native species in order to preserve the present character of the area (Clout & De Poorter, 2006). The 
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need to protect the wilderness, scientific and existence values of Antarctica has caused some to 
argue that the protection of Antarctic wildlife should be considerably more stringent than elsewhere 
(Clout & De Poorter, 2008). 
Protection of the integrity of Antarctic lifeforms from extinction and from genetic hybridisation also 
has tangible scientific benefits. The extreme conditions which Antarctic lifeforms have evolved to 
withstand have led to greater understanding of biological processes and their limits (Convey, 2005), 
while bioprospecting continues for new biological compounds, such as those with antifreeze 





Detailed work has been performed to understand the ways in which alien species reach Antarctica. 
Such understanding can then be used to make changes which reduce the propagule pressure, i.e. the 
number of viable individuals reaching the continent. These approaches are clearly relevant beyond 
Antarctica to the biosecurity challenges that face other nations such as New Zealand and Australia. 
There are, however, two differences. Firstly, continental Antarctica lacks any agriculture (Hughes, 
Pertierra, Molina-Montenegro & Convey, 2015), the economics of protecting the ecosystem are very 
different, in terms of motives, practicalities and the sources of funds to carry out protective 
measures (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). Secondly, the continent is not under the jurisdiction of any 
single country which means that protective measures co-ordinated between nations must either be 
agreed by consensus (Hughes & Convey, 2014). Alternatively, measure can be enforced by individual 
nations on an ad hoc basis. Despite these differences, the analytical methods have proven to be very 
powerful tools for improving biosecurity practices. 
One valuable method is analysing the activities which introduce alien species (McGeoch, Shaw, 
Terauds, Lee & Chown, 2015). Six of these have been identified as relevant to the wider Antarctic, 
being scientific activities, tourism, residents, imports of fresh produce, agriculture and airfields. Of 
these, all but tourism are relevant to the study of national programmes, which support scientific 
activities, import and grow (hydroponically and in greenhouses) crops, and are served by access to 
airfields; many of their inhabitants reside in the stations for long periods of time. This approach has 
allowed detailed analysis by location and activity across the region, including comparisons between 
locations and identifying areas at particular risk. By identifying the risks it also allows the extent of 
each threat to be evaluated over time as changes take place in the magnitude and nature of the six 
activities. The risks identified by this method are particularly relevant for considering monitoring 
requirements, and will be further discussed in this later section. 
Vector analysis is perhaps even more useful as a tool for studying species’ introductions. Vector 
analysis has identified a very broad range of specific routes by which new species enter the region 
from seeds captured on clothing to cargo packaging, food and timber imports, and the hulls of ships 
and aircraft (Houghton et al, 2016). Direct intervention methods have been made possible by 
detailed investigation of each vector in turn (Pysek & Richardson, 2010) leading, for example, to 
greater education programmes to travellers of the risks (Whinam, Chilcott & Bergstrom, 2005), 
cleaning of boots (Hughes & Convey, 2010), redesign of clothing to avoid the use of Velcro (Whinam 
et al, 2005), fumigation of cargo (Hughes & Convey, 2010) and redesign of crates (Potter, 2006). 
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Even more detailed research has looked at the differences in species transported by each route 
(Houghton et al, 2016), which has clear implications for the effectiveness of different eradication 
chemicals and methods en route.  
 
2.2 Clothing and Personal Items 
While much of the focus has been upon the propagule loads carried by tourists on their clothes and 
boots, it is clear that scientists are at least an equally significant route of introductions. One study 
(Chown et al, 2012) found an estimated 31,732 seeds transmitted by 33,054 tourists and tourism-
related personnel, and 38,897 seeds carried by scientists estimated as numbering 7085, over the 
same period. The scale of problem that scientists represent does not seem to have received the 
same attention in the literature as that posed by tourists.  
The numbers of both scientists and tourists appear to be increasing, though the number of tourists 
remains approximately ten times that of scientists (Molina-Montenegro et al, 2014). However, as 
these researchers point out, scientists remain on the continent longer than tourists, require 
considerable logistical support involving the import of substantial cargo and the construction and 
maintenance of buildings. They assess scientific activity to be greatest during summer melts when 
both vegetative and animal reproduction peaks, and they, like tourists, are concentrated in the ice-
free areas. It should be added to this list that scientists interact on a more intimate basis with the 
environment, camping in remote areas, handing wildlife, and entering remote and/or protected 
areas such as the Dry Valleys, where few very tourists visit. In addition, scientists operate in a very 
different supervisory environment. Compared to tourists, who are supervised by tour operators, 
scientists are more independent and have greater scope for making mistakes while overcoming 
problems which impede their data and sample collection. As Convey (2015) points out, a single 
mistake by a single individual can cause significant contamination of the environment. 
Tourists have been found to have a limited range of clothing for cold destinations (Huiskes et al, 
2014), with the risk their clothing and gear may thus be contaminated with alien species already well 
adapted to cold conditions. It has similarly been highlighted that scientists are also likely to conduct 
research in other cold climate areas, such as the Arctic, with the risk that their clothing and 
equipment may similarly transmit species that have traits favouring survival in the Antarctic. Huiskes 
et al found that footwear, trousers and bags were particularly risky for members of national science 
programmes. Another risk factor for these travellers was whether they had recently visited 
protected, alpine or parkland areas prior to travel (Huiskes et al, 2014). 
Several recommendations can be made in this area. Firstly, that Antarctica New Zealand should not, 
when preparing passengers for departure, require that the bags be set out on the central grassed 
area of the Antarctic Centre for labelling, as was done for the PCAS group’s departure in December 
2015. This procedure could easily be moved to an indoors location, such as the Antarctic Terminal 
waiting room, or within Antarctica New Zealand’s logistics building. Secondly, that travellers be 
required to fill out departure cards regarding their movements over a suitable timeframe prior to 
travel, in the same way that arrival cards for visitors to New Zealand are required to declare whether 
they have had contact with farm animals or visited wilderness areas while abroad. Thirdly, checks 
should be carried out on the footwear of outbound passengers in the same way that checks are 
made on boots being brought into the country; and it may be valuable to extend this to include the 
hems of trousers as well. Fourthly, spot-checks should be carried out on leavers, and fifthly, a bio-
security dog could be used to search for contaminated clothing. Finally, travellers should be required 
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to declare any foodstuffs carried and declare that these are in a clean and/or sealed state. In 
particular, fruit should be visually inspected to ensure that it is free from visible soil or mould 
contamination. In light of the procedures which visitors and returners regularly undergo at airports 
when returning to New Zealand, it seems a particularly strange omission that very similar checks are 
not carried out on flights leaving for a destination with an acknowledged fragile ecosystem and 
which is claimed as New Zealand territory. 
Because clothing has been identified as a route for significant seed transfer, Antarctica New Zealand 
would be well advised to consider amendments to its processes regarding the issue of clothing, 
specifically allowing travellers to take these clothes home with them in the time between clothing 
allocation and travel. Australia has particularly stringent rules relating to clothing worn on journeys 
to the Macquarie islands (Australian Antarctic Division, n.d.). However, such recommendations have 
been made before (Gousemett et al, 2006). 
There are a number of complications regarding personal equipment, and there would be 
considerable resistance to a ban on personal clothing and boots. These might in any case not be 
practical where individuals have particular medical requirements e.g. orthopaedic. Australia’s policy 
of “take it new or keep it clean” (described in Gousemett et al, 2006) somewhat misses the point 
that even new items may already be contaminated (Whinam et al, 2005). For these reasons, it is not 
suggested in this report that individuals be barred from taking their own items, but rather that an 
element of supervision is introduced into the process to ensure that the items are indeed clean. 
 
2.3 Food 
Food is another significant risk for transfer of species to Antarctica. Antarctica New Zealand have 
gone to considerable effort to ensure robust procedures, with detailed guidance regarding which 
fresh foods may be imported to Antarctica, the checks that should be performed on each before 
sending, the packaging of the produce, and the procedure for the chef when unpacking the goods, 
alien species are still transported alive to the continent within food shipments (Antarctica New 
Zealand, n.d. a; Antarctica New Zealand, n.d. c). However, the author observed a fellow diner at 
Scott Base discover a green caterpillar - very much alive - within his salad. It is not known whether a 
report was made of the incident. It is acknowledged that food is a known and common problem for 
all nations with bases in Antarctica, and that even the most thorough inspections cannot prevent 
pests being imported (Potter, 2006). Nor is fumigation always effective; pests have been found in 
cargo bound for Macquarie Island even after ozone treatment (Whinam et al, 2005). 
Technology does already exist to significantly reduce the vast majority of food related alien imports, 
in the form of food irradiation. Irradiation of food is an internationally-recognised way to eliminate 
pests, typically from exported fruit and vegetables. It is a safe and fast method to treat foods to 
eradicate pests (UW Food Irradiation Education Group, n.d., para. 2 and 6) which is typically 
performed after the food has already been packaged and sealed for transport. It has been approved 
in Australia and New Zealand for the treatment of some types of produce (Food Standards Australia 
New Zealand, 2014, para. 8). 
As well as being effective at low doses against invertebrates, irradiation is also effective at higher 
doses against food-borne bacteria such as those causing Salmonella, Campylobacter and Esherichia 
coli (National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, n.d., para. 2). These diseases, 
being highly communicable and serious, are a threat to the well-being of humans in Antarctica. They 
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are also potentially transmittable to Antarctic wildlife, both through direct consumption of food 
scraps and through sewage discharge. Salmonella strains have been found in Adelie, Gentoo and 
King penguins (Grimaldi, Seddon, Lyver, Nakagawa & Tompkins, 2015) and other Antarctic seabirds 
(Palmgren et al, 2000), while both salmonella (Palmgren et al, 2000), and Campylobacter have been 
found in Antarctic seals (Garcia-Pena et al, 2010). The discovery of Campylobacter in Macaroni 
penguins has been tentatively identified as an introduction to the Antarctic area (Griekspoor, Olsen 
& Waldenstrom, 2009). The transmission of these diseases is a major cause for concern even though, 
as Grimaldi et al (2015) note, the effect that these diseases have on the wellbeing of these animal 
populations is generally not clear. However, food irradiation could not be used to eradicate viruses 
potentially carried on food as viruses are highly resistant to radiation, even at very high doses. This 
includes poultry viruses such as infectious bursal disease, commonly found on commercially raised 
poultry and for which there is evidence of immunity, indicating prior exposure within Antarctic 
penguin populations (Grimaldi et al, 2015). 
Despite the suitability of irradiation for cargo destined for Antarctica, it is clear that irradiation is 
unlikely to be a short, or even medium-term solution to the problem. This is because of public 
opposition to irradiated foods, the limits on Australasian approval for food irradiation, and the lack 
of suitable facilities to supply irradiated food from Christchurch. However, it is recommended that 
the feasibility of supplying irradiated foods be periodically reviewed. 
Similarly, with regard to the possibility of transmitting food-related disease to wildlife, a review 
should be made of the forms of meats supplied to field camps. In particular, it should be considered 
whether uncooked meat, whether chilled or frozen, and freeze-dried meat should cease to be 
supplied to field camps (Australian Antarctic Division, 2008), unless it has been adequately prepared 
for eating by another method, such as smoking or salting. 
 
2.4 Business Processes Review 
A useful exercise for Antarctica New Zealand to carry out on the prevention (quarantine) aspects of 
its operations would be a full business processes review. This is a comprehensive investigation into 
the nature of employees’ roles and their tasks which many businesses find useful in a number of 
ways. It can, for example,  
• lead to more efficient allocation of tasks between employees, 
• identify training needs, 
• assist when hiring and during performance reviews,  
• identify areas for improvement such as stocks of essentials running low (e.g. the female 
urinary directors which could not be supplied to our group with sufficient time before 
departure to practice their use),  
• show areas where cost savings can be made, and also  
• highlight areas where current practices expose the organisation to undue risks (health and 
safety, publicity, environmental, litigation).  
A business process review should highlight the tasks that each employee carries out and the method 
used, as well as the location the tasks are performed in. Such an analysis would, for example, show 
that pre-travelling labelling of luggage is currently carried out on a grassed area. The results of such 
an analysis would then enable changes to be made where appropriate and feasible. 






Quarantine measures to prevent alien species reaching Antarctica have, historically, tended to be 
the focus of biosecurity measures. This is because, despite quarantine procedures being costly and 
time-consuming, the cheapest and easiest way to deal with invasions is often by pre-emptively 
preventing them from occurring (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). However, the realisation that 
quarantine measures can never be completely effective has led to greater emphasis on monitoring 
and response. Incidents such as Poa annua invasions and the fly invasions at Rothera and Casey 
stations appear to have been discovered only at the point that the invasions became manifest. By 
contrast, effective monitoring should be an active process of checking before any overt signs of a 
problem become apparent. Monitoring is not a necessary precursor to response, since many invasive 
species will eventually become obvious by themselves. But monitoring offers a better chance of 
achieving effective response by discovering and eradicating alien populations before they become 
too large and too established to be destroyed, and by collecting data about transient invasions, 
which might otherwise not be discovered at all.  
In some instances, monitoring for pest invasions in the Antarctic seems to have been carried out in 
response to incidents rather than being proactive. Fly traps and electric fly killers were installed at 
Rothera station only after their fly infestation was discovered (Hughes et al, 2005). There is a very 
real danger of precautionary monitoring measures being seen as excessive and unnecessary until 
such time as they are proven otherwise. However, a recent survey by COMNAP found that National 
Antarctic Programmes who conducted research into the subject of invasive species were likely to 
improve their own monitoring and surveillance procedures, perhaps indicating that in some cases 
the results of the research came as an unpleasant shock to some countries (COMNAP, 2008). 
 
3.2 Recent Progress in International Monitoring Measures 
It has been noted by McGeoch et al (2015) that the lack of a system for tracking invasive species in 
the Antarctic, and the lack of an established baseline for identifying trends, has been a huge gap in 
the monitoring process. These researchers have recently carried out significant work in this area, 
with the result that this work may now be used going forward to identify trends and reduce risks 
relating to invasive species in the Antarctic region 
In addition, McGeoch et al (2015) also noted the lack of a system for formally documenting impacts 
of and responses to aliens, for sharing information and answering questions relating to interventions 
and policy developments on the issue. This too has been addressed in recent years, with the 
Antarctic Treaty System reports “Colonisation status of known non-native species in the Antarctic 
terrestrial environment 2010” and” Colonisation status of known non-native species in the Antarctic 
terrestrial environment (updated 2013)”. These collations of known invasions have done much to 
allow such tracking as McGeoch et al call for. There is now hope that monitoring of invasive species 
can be co-ordinated internationally, guidance issued to promote effective monitoring techniques, 
and an enhanced level of international communication and accountability.  
In addition, as Convey (2011) notes, the Committee for Environmental Protection of the Antarctic 
Treaty System now has the introduction of new species as a standing agenda item. It is hoped that 
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this will help to ensure that all known instances of alien species in the region are recorded and 
communicated. 
The Australian Antarctic Division has since 2004 compiled a searchable database of all invertebrates 
found – whether captured or not - on stations, supply ships and aircraft in the Antarctic (Houghton 
et al, 2016). This has yielded some very interesting results; the numbers and types of species found 
in particular places and, in some cases, whether the specimen was still alive upon discovery. From 
this information, it is now identified that some species survive fumigation processes by being deep 
within the food, and that winged species can arrive on the ship through flight, thus evading dock-
based quarantine processes. Furthermore, and perhaps unexpectedly, it seems that most of the 
invertebrates discovered were live adults at the time of transportation rather than in an egg or 
larvae form. The collation of similar records by New Zealand would be a very useful addition to this. 
 
3.3 Flies and other Invertebrates 
Flies are now known to be a particular problem in Antarctica’s stations, whose buildings provide 
suitable conditions for colonisation. The fly problem at Rothera seems to have been eliminated, but 
Scott Base has had a number of incidents involving flies and other insects (Antarctica New Zealand, 
n.d. d), and the black fungus midge that infested the Casey sewage system has not been eradicated 
(Hughes et al, 2015). More broadly within the Antarctic region there are a number of similar 
instances of invasive alien fly populations becoming established. The Diptera fly infested the sewage 
system at the Artigas base on King George Island and has been similarly persistent, now being found 
4km from the station (“Colonisation status”, 2010). Hughes, Pertierra, Molina-Montenegro and 
Convey write that ”While successful eradications have occurred within station buildings and 
hydroponic facilities, no successful eradications of non-native invertebrates have occurred within 
Antarctic sewage treatment systems” (Hughes et al, 2015) 
Various monitoring techniques are already carried out at Scott Base, including fly traps and roach 
traps. These appear to be concentrated in the kitchen and the Hillary Field Centre (HFC) (Antarctica 
New Zealand, n.d. d). The traps in the kitchen form part of the process for opening and inspecting 
freshly imported produce, whereas the HFC traps appear also to have been prompted by food 
related incidents; one is positioned near the beer store. It is not stated in the documentation that 
there are any traps in or near the waste processing area and, if there are indeed no traps here, this is 
a notable omission. Insect traps around the sleeping and laundry quarters should also be considered. 
Bedroom quarters are also an area where people may store food or empty out clothing with crumbs 
caught in it; the author was bitten while sleeping by an insect which appeared to be caught up in the 
bed linen. Insect traps are a low-cost method for early detection, and this should be relatively easy 
to implement, although some communication with the rooms’ inhabitants may be necessary to co-
ordinate checking the traps with the rooms’ availability. 
As well as in these areas within the base building proper, it is also strongly suggested that insect 
traps be positioned within and around the containers and outbuildings. Some containers, such as 
those containing imported wood products such as bamboo canes, are obvious candidates for 
monitoring. However, all structures can provide shelter for insects in the same way they are known 
to provide shelter for plants (Molina-Montenegro et al, 2014), and therefore monitoring procedures 
should not be limited to these containers. 
It is known that in the past the fly traps at Scott Base have not been checked as required (Antarctica 
New Zealand, n.d. d), and it is not clear whether they were being checked as per the weekly 
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schedule during the PCAS group’s visit. There was a gap of at least two weeks between the first 
known insect bite and official recognition of the problem. It is equally plausible that the traps were 
simply in the wrong location to detect the problem, or that the insects in questions were not flies. 
Scott Base procedures give detailed advice for returning specimens of flies, and other invaders, 
discovered at the base, back to New Zealand for analysis, (Antarctica New Zealand, n.d. b). The level 
of detail of this advice is commendable. Detailed understanding of the stages that a species passes 
through can be powerful knowledge when planning eradication, as certain methods may not work as 
effectively on larvae and eggs as on adults. Clues may also be obtained as to what the species is 
feeding upon, which might in some cases involve another, undetected, alien species. In addition, 
information regarding transmission routes can sometimes be obtained using DNA evidence (Chown, 
Sinclair & Jansen van Vuuren, 2008; Jansen van Vuuren & Chown, 2007). With the recent 
development of portable DNA testing devices, it might be possible to carry out preliminary analyses 
of samples without waiting for transport to New Zealand (Perez, 2013). Alternatively, similar 
facilities might be available for use at McMurdo to expedite the start of eradication.  
 
3.4 Plants 
With regard to invasive plants in the area, it is not known what procedures, if any, exist to monitor 
the disturbed ground around Scott Base, which is a particularly attractive environment for the 
establishment of grass species. Much of the base area is subject to heavy traffic, which would both 
decrease the likelihood of plants becoming established, and also increase the likelihood of a plant 
being spotted. However, there are areas, such as under the buildings around the snowmelt line, 
under or around the containers, and behind out-buildings, where an invasive plant could perhaps 
establish itself and come to seed without being spotted. It is therefore recommended that regular 
inspections be carried out around areas of the base assessed as being at higher risk. The frequency 
of inspection should relate to the likely time that an invasive species, such as Poa annua, would grow 
from a shoot to reaching the point of seeding. 
Monitoring for any possible spread of plant propagules to the area outside of the base is an 
immense challenge, and one that should properly be the focus of planning at an international level. 
In the meantime, attention should be paid to ice-free areas near to the base and near to those areas 
used for recreation (such as Castle Rock) and research. A thorough inspection of these is clearly 
neither practical nor even possible, given the size of the areas concerned and their challenging 
terrains. Inspections might well pose a higher risk for introducing new propagules than discovering 
existing ones. However, inspection of the area using binoculars from suitable vantage points might 
be feasible. Such inspection should also be made of Crater Hill and the cliffs outside Scott Base. Both 
these locations are vulnerable to introductions due to their proximity to the base and would be 
extremely challenging to eradicate invasive plants from if they had had the opportunity to spread 
over a large area. 
 
3.5 Waste 
Antarctica New Zealand has stringent procedures to ensure that human waste is returned to the 
station for correct disposal. However, this has not always been the case, and global warming is 
currently causing melting of the snow cover on a number of historic lavatory sites. Human, dog and 
pony faeces have been identified in such deposits on the Peninsula (Hughes and Nobbs, 2004). The 
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area around Scott Base has been used for exploration since the earliest days of Antarctic 
exploration, and thus there is reason to suspect that such sites also exist in the vicinity of Scott Base.  
There also remains the ongoing risk of contamination due to human error. A pee bottle was recently 
lost by a member of the PCAS group while descending the rock face of Castle Rock. This is a reminder 
that waste accidents are likely to occur despite best precautions. The bottle was not able to be 
recovered due to the steep nature of the terrain, and it is not known whether it is survived the 
descent intact or whether it burst open against the rocks. 
Not all bacteria can survive the cold, but faecal Enterococci, Bacillus and Clostridium have been 
found to survive for 30-40 years and it is thought that sporing bacteria such as Bacillus and 
Clostridium may survive for considerably longer (Hughes & Nobbs, 2004). All known historic 
campsites should therefore be monitored for signs of melting, and it may be possible to use radar 
and other techniques to ascertain whether any rubbish dumps or latrines are present. An 
assessment should be made on a site by site basis whether it would be safer to leave the area 
untouched, or to remove the rubbish while still frozen. 
Kitchen and sewage waste have been identified as routes for the introduction of a range of new 
bacteria, including diseases that may be transmitted to wildlife (Potter, 2006). More research is 
required on the dangers regarding kitchen waste, but sewage is already a known concern. The 
sewage-related bacterium Clostridium perfringens has spread 800m from the McMurdo sewage 
outfall (Gousemett et al 2006), and antibiotic resistant Esherichia coli has been found near to a 
research station in the maritime Antarctic region (Grimaldi et al, 2015).  
Both McMurdo and Scott Base stations have sewage treatment facilities, with the McMurdo 
treatment process being more extensive than the New Zealand process. However, as bacterial 
contaminations have been found associated with the McMurdo site, this may suggest that there is 
room for improvement of both. More research is needed regarding the nature and extent of these 
risks, as improvements to the Scott Base sewage system would no doubt be costly and inconvenient, 
and might still not address all the associated risks. In particular, research is required upon the effect 
of human-transmitted diseases upon infected Antarctic wildlife, as the consequences of infection are 
generally still not known (Grimaldi et al, 2015). Special consideration should also be given to the 
problem of antibiotic resistance. It is unlikely that significant changes will be made in this area 
without solid research to justify improvements, and/or without significant change in current 
technology. 
 
3.6 Biosecurity Officer 
Ships to the Macquarie and Heard Islands have for some time been accompanied by biosecurity 
officers. This has resulted in improved understanding of the risks among travellers and staff, and a 
notably reduction in the quantities of alien material discovered (Whinam et al, 2005). A similar – 
fulltime - position created at Scott Base would permit a more pro-active approach to the ongoing 
problem of alien invaders. The responsibilities of this position could include responsibility for liaising 
with visitors and permanent staff, for educating, for inspecting and for managing information flow to 
other bases in the region.  
A biosecurity officer would be ideally placed to carry out the inspections for plants noted above and, 
if suitably skilled, might also be able to carry out DNA analysis of samples previously discussed. In 
addition, a number of specific examples, as noted from the PCAS group’s recent visit to the station 
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can be cited. Firstly, by liaising with the transient population of scientists and students, incidents 
might more reliably be reported, such as the caterpillar and the insect bites. The author discovered a 
very fresh insect bite on her first morning at the station and reported it to a field trainer, but as the 
trainer believed the bite could have happened previously, no further advice was given or action 
taken. Two weeks later, an announcement was made at the Saturday afternoon meeting, that a 
number of bites had been reported and a request was made to anyone who had also been bitten to 
report it. Upon doing so, the author discovered that her initial report had not been passed on, and at 
that time it transpired that a number of other members of the group had also been bitten. Had the 
PCAS group been scheduled for departure two days earlier than planned, we would have missed this 
meeting, and our incidents would not have been recorded.  
Secondly, a biosecurity officer would also be well placed to investigate the apparent potted plant at 
Square Frame Hut. Such potted plants contravene the Environmental Protocol (Hughes, Pertierra 
Molina-Montenegro & Convey, 2015). In recent years there has been considerable pressure to 
remove such items from station buildings as they constitute both a disease risk upon importation 
(Smith, 1996; Potter 2006) and may harbour other alien species which are later introduced.  
 
3.7 Reporting System Improvement 
Scott Base does have an incident reporting system which in theory should have been suitable for 
recording the insect bites experienced by multiple members of the PCAS group. However, our group 
was not shown the reporting system, and the author was not advised to file an official report of her 
bite. Furthermore, intranet reporting systems, while they may be adequate for established groups of 
employees, are not as suitable for transient individuals, who are unlikely to be familiar with the 
base’s (many) processes in general and their intranet in particular. These visitors may be extremely 
busy and perhaps somewhat overwhelmed, and may have difficulty getting access to one of the few 
computers available for public use. In such a case, an identified biosecurity officer could be an 
invaluable point of first contact. In their absence.  
It is also recommended that field trainers ensure all reports of such incidents are made - even if this 
requires them to make the report themselves. A helpful measure would be paper forms to make 
reports on – perhaps even issued as part of the introductory process. Copies of this form could be 
kept at the Comms office, since this is always manned, and in the mess hall, since the caterpillar 
incident is likely to be fairly common. As well as improving the proportion of incidents that are 
reported, this would also facilitate the promptness and accuracy of reporting. 
With regard to reporting, it would also be helpful if the procedures for reporting incidents were to 
be prominently displayed around the base, perhaps on A1 sized posters similar to those already on 
display. 
 
3.8 Risk Based Monitoring 
Effective monitoring is at its heart a risk-based procedure; as resources are limited they must 
therefore must be targeted effectively and intelligently at areas of higher risk. Analysis of activities is 
useful in identifying particular pathways of increased risk. For this reason, it is useful to know 
whether the nature or scale of particular activities in particular regions are increasing or decreasing. 
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Charting changes in the activities conducted from Scott Base would be an interesting area for further 
research, and could highlight other areas where more prevention and monitoring are required. For 
example, an increase in the risk associated with air travel could be due to an increase in the amount 
of helicopter flights from the base, changes in their destinations (particularly relevant with the 
current focus on supporting research needs at increasingly remote sites) and even the recent use of 
a drone operated from the base site. 
The nature of risks also changes seasonally over the year, as does the effectiveness of monitoring 
techniques (Montoya, Rogers & Memmott, 2012). Risks from food imports during the summer 
months change to those presented by the over-winter hydroponics system (Antarctica New Zealand, 
n.d. e). However, the increase in winter flights to McMurdo may change this profile if fresh food 
supplies for Scott Base are included on these flights. In principle, if these flights continue to be 
operated monthly throughout the winter as currently planned, there may be a reduced need for the 
hydroponics system. Flights are correlated, in many bases, with newly discovered fly invaders 
(Hughes et al, 2011), most likely associated with food imports. Therefore the overall winter risk of 
flies may increase in future due to the increase in flights, even if the hydroponic system were no 
longer used. The combination of both a hydroponics system and monthly winter flights might be 
particularly risky. Many stations have had incidents of infestations of their hydroponics facilities, 
including the US, New Zealand and Australia (Hughes et al, 2015), and this area remains a risk, albeit 
one which Antarctica New Zealand knowingly accepts and mitigates with cleaning and inspection 
procedures (Antarctica New Zealand, n.d. e). Going forwards, however, this acceptance may need to 
be reassessed due to the increase in winter flights. 
One activity not in the list of risky activities described by McGeoch et al (2015), but identified by a 
number of authors, is that of construction. Imported building sand in the 1980s is believed to be the 
source of two plant introductions on Marion Island (Gremmen & Smith, 1999). Station construction 
is estimated to account for 2,000-3,000 imported seeds per year of work (Huiskes et al, 2014). A 
number of alien lichens (Osyczka 2010), fungi and invertebrates have been identified in timber 
imports (Osyczka, Mleczko, Karasinski & Chlebicki, 2012).  
Major building work is currently being carried out at Scott Base. While it seems now to be 
increasingly accepted that timber used for construction should be pre-treated and be imported 
without bark, it is not plausible to think that all threats associated with these imports, including 
microscopic spores and insect eggs, can be wholly prevented. Therefore, this project represents a 
significant increase in risk at the station which will need to be compensated for by monitoring which 
is increased both in distribution and scope. Areas of disturbed ground are known to be particularly 
prone to invasion by alien plant species, due to modification of soil nutrient levels as well as the 
enhanced opportunities for introduction and dispersion (Molina-Montenegro et al, 2014). Since 
building work causes a large amount of ground disturbance, the elevated risk associated with this 
and other building projects must be treated as a long term risk increase requiring a correspondingly 




A key difference between monitoring and response as policies is that response is most likely to be 
agreed to, and carried out through co-ordinated action, between governments, or by an individual 
government’s policy effected through the actions of their National Programme personnel. By 
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contrast, monitoring may be carried out at this international level, at an individual country level, by 
individual scientists without implying buy-in by their respective governments, or by international 
organisations such as SCAR.  
Historically, responses to discovered alien populations seem to have been carried out on an ad hoc 
basis. While half of nations surveyed declared that they had a response plan, many of these were 
extremely limited in scope (De Poorter, Gilbert, Storey & Rogan-Finnemore, 2006). Most countries 
are still gathering information rather than formulating comprehensive strategies, and there seems to 
be a lack of co-ordinated response plans (Gousemett et al, 2006).  
As invasions have generally been discovered in, or very near to, national research stations, the 
responsibility for response has generally been clear. However, in at least one instance, that of the 
Poa annua grass at Arctowski station, the response was for many years no response, resulting in an 
expansion of the grass population to the extent that it is now threatening a nearby ASPA (Pertierra, 
Lara, Benayas & Hughes, 2013). Within the wider Antarctic region there are several examples of both 
ASPA and ASMA areas being threatened or invaded by alien flies, springtails, grasses and a rush 
(“Colonisation status”, 2013). On the Peninsula, there is concern regarding the continued delay in 
removing the population of Poa pratensis at Cieva Point (Hughes & Convey, 2014). In other instances 
the responses have been unsuccessful (Hughes et al, 2015). The eradication of invertebrates seems, 
from examples within the wider region, to be a particular problem. Although a number of alien 
plants have been eradicated from the Peninsula and nearby islands, no removal has been attempted 
for invertebrates, despite the instances of alien invertebrates increasing (Hughes et al, 2015). 
There does not currently seem to be sufficient will across the Antarctic Treaty signatories to 
establish a unified response policy. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this. Political motives, 
such as not wanting to be told how to administer the area within and around each country’s base, 
are undoubtedly significant. However, there may also be practical reasons, such as that the 
environments around the various bases may be so different, and the activities undertaken from 
them so varied, that standardised policies may be of very limited use. 
If indeed such reasoning plays a part in the apparent reluctance by countries to develop co-
ordinated response plans, three options are open to any country with the will to develop an 
effective plan. One is to develop procedures with as many of the signatory countries as are similarly 
inclined. The second is to pursue common agreements with nearby bases. In New Zealand’s case this 
would mean the US at a minimum. Thirdly, New Zealand can develop its own procedures and hope 
to lead the way in this area. 
A notable exception to the absence of co-ordinated response plans is the recommendations of the 
Workshop on Diseases of Antarctic Wildlife, hosted by the Australian Antarctic Division, regarding 
animal mortality events (Australian Antarctic Division, 2008). This document gives detailed and 
comprehensive guidance regarding routine monitoring of populations, identifying an unusual event, 
for standardised sample collecting, for avoiding contamination, and for reporting. This document 
and its recommendations could form the template for broader discussions on imported species. It 
would also be valuable to consider the people and processes involved in this workshop which 






4.2 Planning an Effective Response Strategy 
With regard to successful eradication, it has been stated that detailed knowledge of the species and 
its lifecycle can be essential to achieving a successful result (Hughes et al, 2015). In addition, the 
same authors state that extensive planning of the eradication regime is required, along with detailed 
risk. However, these requirements are in clear opposition to the requirement to act quickly, while 
populations are still small, localised, and may not be fully established within the local ecosystem.  
How are these two competing requirements to be balanced? One answer to this is by carrying out as 
much of the planning process as is feasible before discovery of an invasive population. As Dwight D 
Eisenhower famously said (as quoted by Notable Quotes, n.d., para 8), “In preparing for battle I have 
always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”. 
Therefore, a significant way forward in this area would be for delegates of countries with bases in 
Antarctica to participate in a workshop to develop a common response plan for dealing with 
invaders. It would be helpful if countries were prepared to table their existing plans for discussion 
and criticism, however this level of participation should not be made a condition of attendance. New 
Zealand would be ideally placed to develop its own set of ideas for discussion in this manner.  
However, if international discussion is not possible to arrange, or if it is unlikely to be arranged in a 
reasonable timeframe, New Zealand policymakers should consider having such discussions 
internally. An area that would be particularly important to develop is specific plans tailored to 
particular species already known to present especial problems in the region. A number of scenarios 
could be worked through, relating, for example, to the following: an extensive population of Poa 
annua on the cliff face near to Scott Base; an infestation of flies in the sewage system; an invasion of 
rats, or mice, in a nearby animal colony; an outbreak within the station of a disease capable of 
transfer to local animal populations; a virus with harmful implications for the native lichen; the 
introduction of toxic algae. For this to be comprehensive, a number of experts should be consulted 
so that a full range of invasive species could be included in these scenarios. 
Neither rats nor mice have been reported on the continent and are thought not to be capable of 
becoming established there (Hughes & Convey, 2010). However, these species have been identified 
as having potential for causing large damage to bird colonies in even the short term, and there 
remains the possibility that a population may become established within a research station (Hughes 
& Convey, 2010). Therefore it would seem unwise not to plan for the damage that even a single 
individual could cause. 
 
4.3 Specific Key Issues Identified  
There are some key issues relating to response that must be addressed before effective response 
plans can be formulated. One of these, relating to plants, is that some species may not grow in the 
Antarctic region in the same way that they do elsewhere, and therefore may not immediately be 
identifiable as an alien. Poa pratensis does not produce seed in its location in the Peninsula while 
Antarctic Poa annua grows in tussocks very different to its growth elsewhere (Wodkiewicz, 
Ziemianski, Kwiecien, Chwedorzewska & Galera, 2014). Five alien species, albeit species believed to 
be transient, were found near Progress II in the Larsemann Hill region of East Antarctica (Hughes & 
Convey, 2010). Only two of these (Puccinellia distans and Alopecurus geniculatus,) were grasses, the 
others were the flowering plants Stellaria media, Rumex pulcher and Chenopodium rubrum. This 
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indicates that advice given to assist in identifying alien plants in the Ross Sea Region will need to be 
very comprehensive and not assume that alien species will necessarily be members of grass families. 
Consideration will be required regarding treatment of species found in distant locations which 
cannot readily be identified. Should these be removed immediately in the “shoot first, ask questions 
later” policy advocated by some (as discussed by Hughes et al, 2015)? This risks contravening the 
Treaty by removing a previously-unidentified native species. However, an invasive plant species 
allowed to remain in place may very quickly seed, potentially contaminating a wide area. A protocol 
addressing this question will need to be put into place pre-emptively, since real-time identification 
from the field by screenshot sent by mobile phone is not currently possible. For animal pests, 
detailed instruction will be required for the capture and/or killing of animal pests, which risks 
attracting negative publicity when details of the guidance reaches the media. 
Another problem is the issue of whether plants have been brought to the area by humans or by 
natural processes, since if they have been brought by natural processes they might be considered 
potentially native and therefore protected (Convey, 2015). This is a greater problem for the 
Peninsula region than for the Ross Island region, but the alien moss Pohlia nutans has been 
identified in the biota of the Mount Rittmann thermal region (Skotnicki, Bargagli & Ninham, 2002), 
and Campulopus pyriformis, a moss native to the South Sandwich Islands has been found on 
geothermal ground around Mount Erebus and Mount Melbourne (Herbold et al, 2014) in what have 
all been speculated to be natural introductions. Guidance will increasingly be required, as these 
populations expand and as new ones are discovered, as to whether they should be removed or 
allowed to grow. 
The question has also been asked whether it might, in some circumstances, be considered 
acceptable to use herbicides and pesticides, which are currently prohibited in the area for such use 
by Annex III (Hughes et al, 2015). Glyphosate has been used to eradicate a species on Marion Island 
(McGeoch et al, 2015). In most Antarctic ASPA areas such chemicals are banned, but the use of 
herbicides was pre-emptively written into the plan for ASPA136 (Hughes et al, 2015); their use 
elsewhere remains at best a grey area. Furthermore, there are concerns as to the effectiveness of 
chemical methods in cold temperatures, and more research would be required in this area 
(Hellmann et al, 2008). 
It has been said that in many cases plant species could effectively be eradicated by “a person with a 
spade” (Hughes et al, 2015). This comment likely remains true in the majority of cases which are 
small and localised to the areas around bases. However the possibility remains of a plant invasion in 
a remote area, such as the Dry Valleys, which is not discovered until it became extensive. As Pysek 
and Richardson (2010) note, there is an inherent contradiction between invasive species and early 
detection since invaders are rare and early detection of isolated instances is very difficult.  
The area of invasion is inversely related to the probability of successful eradication. In California, 
when the affected area is under 100 hectares, eradication has a 30% chance of success, but when 
the area is greater than 1000 hectares, eradication is considered extremely likely to fail (Pysek & 
Richardson, 2010). One question which would be valuable to answer is, what are the appropriate 
comparable areas in the Antarctic region? Would larger areas be easier to eradicate, because of slow 
growth rates? However, Hughes et al (2015) note that eradication attempts fail if native species are 
also eradicated in the area, thereby making future invasion more likely; hence even areas smaller 
than 1000 hectares may in the Antarctic be unrecoverable. 
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In cases where a species has spread so far that its removal would be unduly damaging to the 
environment, such as the spread of the Signy Island midge (Hughes & Convey, 2014), consideration 
should be given to how this is to be ascertained before irreversible damage is done to the 
environment in the attempt. 
When Scott Base formulates its response plans, the guidance relevant to base staff should be 
prominently displayed on posters on locations around the station. 
 
4.4 Other Considerations 
Evidence from elsewhere in the world has yielded a number of helpful observations about successful 
eradication programmes. Pysek and Richardson (2010) have identified reasons for failure which 
include 
• failure to understand the target species,  
• failure to obtain local co-operation, 
• failure to adequately map the species’ spread,  
• failure to make available adequate resources, 
• failure to regularly re-evaluate the process.  
In particular, the cost of eradication projects can be significant. 
A cautionary tale that may yet play out within continental Antarctica is the collapse of food webs 
due to the removal of an alien species. This is unlikely to occur by meso-predator release in the way 
that has been observed elsewhere (Pysek & Richardson, 2010), but could still occur if an alien 
population is left in place long enough for a native species to become reliant upon it for food. 
Some consequences of invasions will not be able to be corrected by the removal of the alien 
responsible. An example is the enhanced nitrogen levels in soil caused by nitrogen-fixing alien plants, 
which have been found to make the area vulnerable to reinvasion (Pysek & Richardson, 2010). The 
only current solution to such problems appears to be prompt removal to minimise the number and 
area of sites thus affected. 
There are also a number of unanswered legal questions, such as what conditions an invasive species 
would have to satisfy before it was considered an emergency (Hughes et al, 2015; Hughes & Convey, 
2014), what legal liability might attach to a country if its citizens were found to be the cause, and 
what the likelihood would be of successful action taken against that country (Hughes and Convey, 
2014). It is not clear whether the Liability Annex, when it comes into force, would make it possible 
for one country to clear up the area around another country’s base, and then recover the costs via 
legal action (Hughes & Convey, 2014); it is even less clear that such an action would be politically 
acceptable. 
A useful investigation which might be carried out in this area would be a failure analysis of the Casey 
Station sewage system fly infestation, to determine the point at which the invasion became 
untreatable. It would also be useful to ascertain the reasoning behind decisions which have left 
populations of alien species in place without eradication attempts. Such discussions with base 




4.5 Other International Contributions that New Zealand Might Make 
New Zealand could make a difference by advocating the updating of the Environmental protocol to 
explicitly cover unintentional introductions, and to cover intra-Antarctic species introductions 
(Hughes et al, 2015).  
Hughes et al (2015) also observe that the current Protocol does not distinguish between alien 
invaders and persistent or transient invaders. However, any amendment to this would probably be 
ill-advised since the difference between these categories is based upon behaviour alone. Therefore 
plants can only be categorised on the basis of past behaviour, which does not necessarily predict 
future behaviour. As Clout and De Poorter write, 
“The lag phase of a future invader is often indistinguishable from the slow rate of spread displayed 
by alien non-invasive species in a new range” (Clout & De Poorter, 2008, p16) 
New Zealand could also advocate for the creation of a central fund for environmental projects such 
as eradications, as suggested by Hughes et al (2015). 
 
5.0 Limitations of the Above Recommendations 
 
This discussion has concentrated heavily on plants and flies and (to a lesser extent) lichens, other 
invertebrates and bacterial and viral diseases. Many of these categories have not received the 
attention they deserve.  
 
5.1 Microbiota 
There has been considerable concern in some quarters about the microbial contamination of 
Antarctica (“Introduction of non-native species in the Antarctic Treaty Area: An increasing problem”, 
1998; Hughes et al, 2013), but it seems that contamination is limited to areas around human activity, 
both past and present (Convey, 2015; Clout & De Poorter, 2008). Broady and Smith (1994), in their 
analysis of algae imported into the Ross Sea region via boots and soil attached to vegetables, 
identified fifty taxa with the potential to colonise the continent. However, they also found little 
evidence for these species spreading from the immediate vicinity of Scott Base.  
These studies strongly indicate that alien microbes are capable of long term survival in these harsh 
conditions, but also suggests that they may not be as mobile as many (Convey, 2011) have thought 
likely. Indeed, it seems that Antarctic microbial life is very well differentiated and even nearby areas 
may host distinct microbial communities. This is, from a conservation point of view, both a good and 
a bad feature; it suggests that perhaps even invasive microbiota may be very locally confined, but 
also implies that there may be a very large number of habitats which need to be protected from 
each other. 
Particular areas have attracted general concern such as potential contamination of Lake Vostok 
through drilling (Frenot et al, 2005), but most scientists seem to regard the microbial contamination 
of the continent to be inevitable because of the extreme difficulty in preventing it. This is a highly 
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under-researched area (as noted by Convey, 2011 and 2015), and one for which much greater 
knowledge will be needed before its risks and mitigation measures can be usefully discussed. 
In the meantime, the suggestion that areas (ASPAs) be set aside in which contamination can be kept 
to a minimum (Hughes et al, 2013) would seem to be a sensible measure for New Zealand to 
support. More research should also be carried out regarding the extent and degree of algal 
contamination around Scott Base going forward. Consideration should also be given to the risks 
surrounding intra-Antarctic contamination, and to whether existing procedure are adequate. 
 
5.2 Diseases 
This report has dealt with the risks of disease transfer, from human to animal, via foods and sewage. 
However, there remain a number of other risks, not least of which is the potential for disease to pass 
directly from animals to humans. While handling of wild animals has been identified as a risk to be 
avoided where possible (Potter, 2006), it is not known what procedures are in place should a 
researcher show signs of a potentially zoonotic illness after working closely with Antarctic wildlife.  
 
5.3 Invertebrates 
Many of the invertebrate organisms in Antarctica live in soil, and little is known about their diversity, 
nor about the extent of spread of alien populations (Convey, 2011). More information is needed 
regarding the extent of invasion of these species, both within and outside research stations. Various 
species of nematodes, dipterans and micro arthropods were imported to Rothera Station on an 
uncleaned construction vehicle (Hughes et al, 2010a), fortunately identified and removed before 
they could contaminate the base area. However, alien earthworms, mites and fly larvae were found 
in discarded soil at the Schirmayer Oasis (“Introduction of non-native species in the Antarctic Treaty 
Area: An increasing problem”, 1998). Alien springtails have already been noted on the South 
Shetland Islands, Adelaide Island and Deception Island (Convey, 2015), while alien nematodes have 
been found on Possession, Kerguelen and Macquarie Islands (Frenot et al, 2005), and even three 
species of alien slugs on the Kerguelen, Macquarie and Marion Islands (Frenot et al, 2005).  
The potential for effective response for alien invertebrates found outside bases is currently very 
limited. The information paper, “Introduction of non-native species in the Antarctic Treaty Area: An 
increasing problem” says, ”If alien organisms manage to establish themselves in the Antarctic, 
removal will only be possible very locally and only for the larger, visible organisms, like grasses and 
maybe invertebrates if the medium they are living in can be removed.” (“Introduction of non-native 
species in the Antarctic Treaty Area: An increasing problem”, 1998) 
The task of keeping alien microorganisms of all kinds out of the continent has been described as 
“impossible” (Hughes & Convey, 2010). Therefore, until adequate knowledge is known about this 
group of species, and until specific targets for prevention and eradication have been identified, it is 
probably impractical to recommend that Scott Base to carry out any additional procedures regarding 





5.4 Intra-Antarctic Contamination 
Contamination within the Antarctic region is increasingly being regarded as at least as significant as 
preventing invasions from outside the continent (Convey, 2011). Fifteen distinct regions within the 
continent have so far been identified (Convey, 2015). Ross Island sits just off the mainland adjacent 
to the South Victoria Land bioregion, with the Transantarctic Mountain region and North Victoria 
Land regions nearby and the Marie Byrd Land region across the Ross Sea (“Study Identifies 
Biogeographic Regions in Antarctica”, 2012). Projects such as monitoring the penguin colonies at 
Cape Adair are already known to be supported from Scott Base.  
As Scott Base increasingly supports more distant research projects, it will also have to deal with 
intra-Antarctic contamination issues. Antarctic species transported across these boundaries are 
expected to have inherent advantages for colonisation, being already adapted to the harsh Antarctic 
climate (Convey, 2015), and some species may well become invasive when transported between 
different continental environments. Hughes and Convey (2010) identify even smaller regions, such as 
ranges or individual nunataks as possessing biologically isolated and therefore supporting diverse 
species. Furthermore, as more of these biologically distinct areas are identified, the greater will be 
the costs and inconvenience associated with preventing contamination among them (Hughes & 
Convey, 2010). Potter (2006) identifies the lack of suitable quarantine procedures for air transport as 
a key area to be developed, including, for example, decontamination of the landing skids of 
helicopters such as those used as Scott Base.  
At the most local level, that of individual nunataks, species contamination may be occurring at a 
significant rate even within Ross Island. Mitigation measures to limit this might, for example 
necessitate boot change or cleaning between visits to individual nunataks, or possibly even smaller 
scales. This is unlikely to be a popular measure, and more research is required to ascertain whether 




The development of adequate biosecurity policies in the region is hampered by the slow nature of 
the Antarctic Treaty system, the lack of co-ordination between the signatory countries, and 
particularly by the lack of knowledge of Antarctic biota, most particularly at the microscopic level. 
There is also the difficult human problem, when introducing new precautionary procedures, of 
persuading people that these new procedures are necessary. New Zealand has already done much to 
implement many of the recommendations made by Ranjith et al (2012) and others. New Zealand 
may therefore be reaching the limit of ’easy wins’, changes which can be made in this area without 
adjustment of the attitudes, practices and expectations of those who work on and in conjunction 
with Scott Base.  
Biosecurity within the region has already seen a dramatic shift away from the soil transportation 
experiments of the 1950s-1970s as described by Convey (2015), towards increasingly stringent 
quarantine procedures and the rather less comprehensive monitoring and response policies that are 
now emerging. It is expected that the trend will continue in the foreseeable future as more 
information becomes available regarding the diversity of life on the Antarctic continent, and the 
effects of alien species within this area, the wider Antarctic and beyond. In addition, the emergence 
of legal liability for biological contamination of the continent is a salutary reminder that nations may, 
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in the future, face penalties for breaches. Nevertheless, since the only possible way to prevent 
contaminations occurring at the bacterial level would require withdraw from the continent 
altogether (Convey, 2015), some balance must be found to minimise the contamination caused by 
human use of the continent as this use expands. It is hoped that the recommendations made in this 
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8.0 Appendix: Summary of Recommendations 
 
2.2 Clothing and Personal Items 
Antarctica New Zealand should not, when preparing passengers for departure, require that the bags 
be set out on the central grassed area of the Antarctic Centre for labelling 
Secondly, that travellers be required to fill out departure cards regarding their movements over a 
suitable timeframe prior to travel and  declare whether they have had contact with farm animals or 
visited wilderness areas while abroad.  
Thirdly, checks should be carried out on the footwear of outbound passengers; it may be valuable to 
extend this to include the hems of trousers as well.  
Spot-checks should be carried out on leavers 
A bio-security dog could be used to search for contaminated clothing.  
Travellers should be required to declare any foodstuffs carried and declare that these are in a clean 
and/or sealed state. Fruit should be visually inspected to ensure that it is free from visible soil or 
mould contamination. 
2.3 Food 
The feasibility of supplying irradiated foods, particularly fruit and vegetables, be periodically 
reviewed. 
Consideration is required whether uncooked meat, whether chilled or frozen, and freeze-dried meat 
should cease to be supplied to field camps in light of the risks of meat-borne diseases 
2.4 Business Process Review 
A full business processes review should be carried out on departure procedures and those relating to 




3.2 Recent Progress in International Monitoring Measures 
New Zealand should consider setting up a database of invertebrates discovered in and en route to 
Antarctica, similar to that maintained by the Australian Antarctic Division. 
3.3 Flies and other Invertebrates 
Insect traps should be installed in the sleeping quarters at Scott Base 
Insect traps should be installed in and around containers and outbuildings 
Investigation could be made into the feasibility of DNA analysis of alien specimens at Scott Base 
3.4 Plants 
The Scott Base area should be periodically inspected for alien plants, particularly areas around the 
building perimeter, containers and outbuildings, where plants might establish 
Periodic monitoring with binoculars could be made of high risk, frequently visited ice free areas 
outside the base, such as Crater Hill and the cliffs outside Scott Base. 
3.5 Waste 
Investigation should be made of all known historic camps which may contain rubbish dumps and 
latrines, and an assessment made of the contamination risk. 
More research is required on the risk of disease transfer through the sewage system 
3.6 Biosecurity Officer 
It is recommended that a fulltime biosecurity officer post be created. 
The biosecurity officer should investigate the plant seen in Square Frame Hut 
3.6 Reporting System Improvement 
The base’s incident reporting system should be reviewed. Measures to make it more user-friendly 
for visitors include paper forms, perhaps issued on arrival. 
Long-term base staff should ensure the reporting of all incidents that they hear about   
Reporting instructions should be prominently displayed on A1 posters around the base. 
3.7 Risk-Based Monitoring 
The enhanced risk of combining winter hydroponics with monthly winter flights and fresh food 
imports requires reassessment. 
The increased risk due to ongoing major construction work will need to be assessed and additional 
monitoring put in place around this area 
4.2 Planning an Effective Response Strategy 
New Zealand should participate in a workshop with other nations to arrive at a common response 
plan or, if this is not possible, hold these discussions internally. 




4.3 Specific Key Issues Identified 
Guidance protocols are required to assist plant species identification, and timescales and methods 
for eradication, especially for discoveries made in remote areas.  
Instructions for the capture and killing of animal aliens are also required 
Guidance is required on whether naturally transported aliens should be treated separately to those 
brought in by humans. 
Guidance is required on the acceptability of herbicides and pesticides. 
Consideration is required as to the identification of species invasions which have progressed too far 
to be effectively treated, before extensive damage is caused in the attempt. 
Scott Base should prominently display its response guidance to staff on A1 posters around the base. 
4.4 Other Considerations 
A failure analysis should be carried out on the Casey fly invasion to identify the point where it 
became untreatable 
Interviews should, if possible, be held with base leaders who have declined to carry out eradications 
of invasive species to understand their motives 
4.5 Other International Contributions that New Zealand Might Make 
New Zealand could advocate for the updating of the Environmental protocol to explicitly cover 
unintentional introductions, and to cover intra-Antarctic species introductions  
New Zealand could also advocate for the creation of a central fund for environmental projects such 
as eradications 
5 Limitations of the Above Recommendations 
Further research is required in all fields, but particularly those relating to microbial contamination, 
transmittable diseases, invertebrates (particularly soil invertebrates) and preventing intra-Antarctic 
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